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Our team looked at the DOD Operational Energy Strategy evolution and 
how it applies to new and modified weapon systems, considering the three-
legged table of the acquisition system: 1) acquisition, 2) requirements and 3) 
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE). We looked at the 
evolution of the operational energy area initiatives (executive orders, Defense 
Science Board studies, strategy and policy documents) with a focus on practical 
ways to gain traction or improve promulgation of key guidance and 
documentation for new-starts and/or upgrades to weapon system acquisition 
programs. Additionally, we highlight a few of the in-service initiatives and process 
improvements underway to reduce fuel consumption.   
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The authors of this research project explored the issues and concepts 
related to operational energy consumption, captured the essential Department of 
Defense operational energy guidance applicable to acquisition efforts, and 
identified how this guidance translates into the improved usage of operational 
energy (OE). Specifically, our team: 
• Underscored the issues, costs, risks, and sustainment burden on 
deployed forces associated with heavy reliance upon significant 
quantities of operational energy, specifically fossil fuels 
• Identified where operational energy policy is being incorporated into 
the requirements and acquisition processes, and determined the 
effectiveness of these decisions to reduce life-cycle energy 
consumption 
• Examined emerging efforts to improve operational energy usage in 
existing DOD aircraft through the acquisition of “drop-in” 
replacement fuel-efficient turbine engines 
• Assessed operational benefits and impacts of energy-related 
solutions that would be of interest to aviation concept developers 
and DOD acquisition communities 
The authors intended to conduct a comprehensive review of operational 
energy policy and guidance in an effort to determine how operational energy 
efficiency concerns affects the acquisition process, with a focus on weapon 
systems consuming the most fuel—aviation platforms. Then we evaluated the 
extent to which efficiency targets are being met, and identified the factors that 
hinder or facilitate the realization of DOD and service efficiency goals. 
The authors reviewed an Army weapon system program, the Improved 
Turbine Engine Program, in an effort to identify and report on the progress that is 
being made to develop more efficient propulsion systems. This included an in-
depth examination of how operational energy guidance is shaping efforts to 
acquire a more powerful and fuel efficient turbine engine component for the  
AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and how this forward thinking 
 xvi 
can be applied throughout DOD. Additionally, the authors studied how the 
Improved Turbine Engine Program is considering energy efficiency parameters 
as a formal part of its acquisition process and how these lessons learned can 
assist other weapons systems programs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Multiple efforts are ongoing to make the Department of Defense (DOD) 
more energy efficient. Initiatives that are focused on reducing energy costs 
associated with DOD’s fixed installations, albeit important, cannot have near the 
impact as improving the energy performance of major weapons systems would. 
Today, a gallon of gas costs the average American less than two dollars a gallon. 
Yet consider how much that same gallon costs (transportation and lives) when 
you have to transport it to the battle field front line in Afghanistan. Weapon 
system energy performance is categorized and defined under the term 
“operational energy,” or OE. The reality is that operational energy accounts for 
the majority of DOD’s energy consumption and therefore represents the area of 
greatest potential savings. 
A. NEED FOR AN OE STRATEGY 
Operational energy is, in every practical sense, the fuel utilized by our 
aircraft, ground vehicles, and ships. The availability of this fuel affects hours 
flown, miles driven, days at sea, supply chain vulnerabilities, and overall 
readiness. Despite advances in alternative fuels, DOD will be dependent upon 
fossil fuels well into the future. The budget environment, high OPTEMPO, threat 
conditions, inefficient platforms, and shrinking natural resources all contribute to 
this multifaceted problem of high dependence upon fossil fuels by our military 
forces. 
Although operational performance considerations will always supplant 
energy efficiency in major weapons systems, gone are the days when the far-
reaching effects of high levels of fossil fuel consumption can be ignored by DOD 
requirements and acquisition communities. Weapon systems cannot simply be 
fielded with the responsibility falling to the warfighter to employ operational 
techniques to manage fuel consumption. Weapon systems efficiency must be 
“designed in” as part of both the requirements and the development process. 
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Turbine engines, which provide the means of energy and propulsion for 
many of DOD’s platforms (tanks, ships, and aircraft), must be considered as a 
prime candidate for fuel efficiency improvements. It is likely that relatively small 
investments in turbine engine technology can yield huge reductions in 
operational energy consumption and costs, while improving operational 
effectiveness and mission endurance.  
B. RESOURCES 
Multiple resources have been identified as to support the analysis, 
including several documents providing DOD’s guidance on operational energy, 
including the DOD Operational Energy Strategy and the DOD Operational 
Energy Strategy Implementation Plan. Other documentation will be obtained from 
the Army’s Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP). The ITEP Analysis of 
Alternatives captures a program-specific approach for finding alternative ways to 
improve energy efficiency. Documentation and reports from the U.S. Army 
Program Executive Officer-Aviation, particularly the project manager for Apache 
and the project manager for the Improved Turbine Engine Program, will be 
essential to understanding specific weapons systems acquisition efforts 
underway to improve utilization of fossil fuels.   
C. DELIVERABLES 
The joint applied project team will refer back to the project objectives, 
summarizing the methods used to examine them and identify the main 
conclusions and recommendations that can be drawn from this study. The 
deliverables will include: 
• Conclusions as to the effectiveness of DOD’s operational energy 
guidance based upon the best practices and lessons learned from 
current weapons systems meeting these initiatives 
• Documentation of example(s) where investments in research, 
development, and testing result in efficiency improvements 
applicable to weapons platforms and the feasibility of applying 
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these energy efficiency upgrades to modernization efforts of legacy 
programs 
• Recommendations for energy-related solutions and acquisition 
approaches that would be of benefit to aviation concept developers 
and acquisition communities 
• Identification of areas where further work is needed to incorporate 
energy performance criteria and the implications for DOD 
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II. RELEVANCE OF THE OE STRATEGY 
The ability for the U.S. military to project power depends in many ways on 
the use of operational energy in the form of petroleum-based fuel products. 
Operational energy is still a relatively new area of interest for DOD, with the 
majority of the significant studies, plans, strategies and policies having been 
developed only within the last decade. The implementation of the overarching 
DOD Operational Energy Strategy should result in reduced costs, improvements 
in operational performance, and less risk for the warfighter. 
A. ENERGY IS THE CRITICAL ENABLER 
The mission statement of the Department of Defense is to “provide the 
military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country” 
(DOD, n.d.). To accomplish its mission, DOD’s corresponding National Military 
Strategy (NMS) consists of the following three foundational pillars: defense of the 
homeland, building security capacity globally, and the ability to project decisive 
combat power in support of national objectives. Successful implementation of the 
NMS depends, in large measure, on U.S. forces’ ability to globally engage and 
forward deploy. Projecting sea, air, and land power worldwide requires access to 
the energy necessary to sustain DOD’s weapons systems and mobility platforms. 
The availability of energy for military operations must serve as an advantage for 
U.S. forces, and not as a detriment. DOD’s energy resources must be secure, of 
sufficient quantity, and available when needed for whatever duration is necessary 
to support the full spectrum of military missions. This makes energy the critical 
enabler that underpins our military’s fundamental contribution to U.S. national 
security. Accordingly, it is essential that operational energy considerations be 
addressed in DOD’s policies and factored into its weapons systems requirements 
and acquisition decisions.   
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B. OPERATIONAL ENERGY VERSUS FACILITY ENERGY 
DOD’s energy portfolio, for the purposes of management and formulating 
policy, classifies energy into two distinct categories: Facility energy (also referred 
to occasionally as installation energy) and operational energy. Facility energy is 
the energy required to heat, cool, and power buildings at DOD’s fixed 
installations as well as the energy consumed by its non-tactical vehicle fleet. 
During FY2014, facility energy accounted for approximately 23% of DOD’s total 
energy cost and 30% of total energy consumption (OASD(EI&E), 2015, p. 15). 
Efforts to manage facility energy consumption are accomplished through energy 
conservation measures in combination with renewable energy technologies. 
Facility energy, while relevant for comparison to operational energy within the 
context of DOD’s total energy portfolio, is outside the scope of this study. 
Operational energy, in contrast to facility energy, is defined by statute. 
Title 10 U.S. Code legally defines operational energy as “energy required for 
training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for 
military operations” (10 U.S. Code § 2924(5)). Similar to Congress’ definition of 
operational energy, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) uses the 
terminology “mobility energy” as “the energy required for moving and sustaining 
DOD’s forces and weapons platforms for military operations” (GAO, 2008, p. 1). 
The definition of operational energy can represent energy used by soldiers, 
weapons and mobility platforms, and contingency bases. Operational energy, as 
defined, can apply to different types of energy sources such as batteries used by 
soldiers to power their equipment. Practically speaking, operational energy is 
predominantly the liquid fuel utilized by our aircraft, ground vehicles, ships, and 
contingency bases. Despite technological advancements in alternative fuel 
options, petroleum-based fuels such as aviation fuel (and to a lesser extent 
diesel) remain the lifeblood of DOD weapons systems. 
Figure 1 shows that aviation grade fuels comprise the largest portion of 
DOD’s total operational energy consumption in FY2014, representing the area 
with the greatest potential to save the most number of gallons. Figure 1 also 
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illustrates that airborne tankers accounted for 12% of total operational energy 
use. This represents a significant amount of DOD’s total operational energy 
being used for the purpose of transporting operational energy for other weapons 
systems. The availability of and access to operational energy directly affects 
hours flown, miles driven, days at sea, readiness and operations. During 
FY2014, operational energy accounted for approximately 77% of DOD’s total 
energy cost and 70% of total energy consumption (OASD(EI&E), 2015, p. 15).  
 
Figure 1.  FY2014 Operational Energy Breakdown. 
Source: DOD (2016), p. 4. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that operational energy comprises the majority share of 
DOD’s energy cost and consumption, therefore offering the greatest area for 
potential savings. Operational energy management is not just about saving 
money, going “green” or the conservation of natural resources. The central focus 
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of operational energy management is about understanding and improving 
energy’s contribution to overall operational efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Figure 2.  Facility and Operational Energy 
Operational effectiveness benefits (such as extended range, endurance, 
and payload) that result from the increased energy performance of weapons 
systems are far more valuable to DOD than just saving fuel, but it must be noted 
that efficiency contributes to effectiveness. To achieve the goals of DOD’s 
Operational Energy Strategy, the requirements and acquisition processes must 
work together to field weapons systems that have better energy performance 
while retaining or improving upon existing capabilities. It is arguable that facility 
energy initiatives, while important in their own right, do not offer the same 
potential return on investment for DOD’s energy portfolio as improving the energy 
performance of weapons systems and mobility platforms. 
Historical data for operational energy demand is based upon net sales of 
liquid fuels by the Defense Logistics Agency to the DOD Service Components. 
Per data obtained from the FY2014 Operational Energy Annual Report shown in 
Figure 3, operational energy demand per fiscal year went from 110.6 million 
barrels in FY2009 to 87.4 million in FY2014. This 23.2 million barrel reduction per 
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year in demand represents an almost 21% decrease per year in operational 
energy demand over the six year period. This reduction in demand is due in part 
to DOD’s operational energy initiatives as well as the corresponding reduction in 
deployed forces in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility during the period of 
FY2011–FY2014. Requirements for operational energy per fiscal year are 
projected to remain flat over the period FY2014–FY2016. Expenditures per fiscal 
year for operational energy increased from FY2009 to FY2014 from $10.2 billion 
to $14.0 billion, respectively, a 37.25% increase over the six-year period, which is 
indicative of the long-term trend of rising oil prices. Expenditures for operational 
energy per fiscal year are anticipated to decline over the period FY2014–FY2016 
by almost 8% (OUSD[AT&L], 2015, pp. 13–14). 
Figure 3.  DOD Operational Energy Demand FY 2009–2016. Source: 
OUSD(AT&L) (2015), p. 13. 
While the overall demand for operational energy has shown signs of 
decrease, the total operational energy demand remains high. DOD has made 
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military energy security a high priority to deal with threats to its energy supply 
and manage the challenges associated with demand for this mission critical 
resource. The concept of military energy security is described by the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as “the assured access to reliable supplies 
of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet 
operational needs” (DOD, 2010, p. 87). Military energy security serves as a 
necessary precondition to the conduct of military operations because insufficient 
or interrupted energy supplies diminish operational capability and jeopardize 
mission success. There are significant financial, operational, and strategic 
challenges and risks to ensuring military energy security and they are all related 
to the dependence on petroleum-based fuels and the demand for this form of 
operational energy. 
C. FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AND RISKS 
DOD’s aggregate consumption of petroleum-based fuel and the financial 
cost with that consumption is staggering. The demand for operational energy 
over the period from FY2007 through FY2014 necessitated the purchase of 32 
billion gallons of petroleum-based fuel at a cost of approximately $107.2 billion 
(GAO, 2015, p. 12). This level of military energy consumption makes the DOD 
our nation’s single largest energy consumer (EESI, 2011) and arguably the 
largest fuel consuming entity in the world. Ideologically motivated movements, 
violent extremist organizations, and geopolitical events all have the potential to 
negatively affect the price or availability of oil. The 1973 Yom Kippur War 
triggered in the 1973 oil crises, and the Iranian Revolution resulted in the 1979 oil 
crisis. Volatility in oil markets and rising energy costs creates uncertainty in the 
defense budget. DOD is not immune from the adverse effects of unstable 
supplies and rising energy costs. When the cost of fuel rises, this has an 
undesirable effect on DOD’s overall operating budget and undermines the U.S. 
military’s operational readiness. To put this in context, a  
$10 increase in a barrel of oil is estimated to increase the cost of DOD’s 
operations by $1.3 billion (Warner and Singer, 2008, p. 3). There’s also the 
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indirect cost associated with the U.S. military’s enduring presence in the Persian 
Gulf for the purpose of protecting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. 
Princeton Professor Roger Stern estimated that for the period since the U.S. 
began guarding Persian Gulf shipping lanes through the year 2010, it has spent 
about $8 trillion ensuring oil flow to global markets (TIME Battleland, 2011). 
D. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND RISKS 
The U.S. military’s operational energy demand is not only financially 
challenging, it has become an increasingly complex and risky undertaking to 
satisfy the “unnecessarily high and growing battlespace fuel demand” (DSB, 
2008, p.3). On the battlefield this high demand translates to vulnerable fuel 
convoys that must provide the last tactical mile of resupply. Fuel and water 
convoys must move through dangerous territory in the face of improvised 
explosives and asymmetric forces. During the period of FY 2003–2007 more than 
3,000 personnel (U.S. forces and contractors combined) were either wounded or 
killed in action as a result of attacks on convoys representing approximately half 
of the total casualties (ASD(OEPP), 2011, p. 5). 
Protecting fuel convoys require that combat power be diverted from its 
primary mission to, instead, the task of guarding and moving fuel. Improvised 
explosive devices and ambushes are projected to threaten fuel-supplying 
convoys well into the near future (DOD, 2016 p. 9). When threat conditions 
become too great a risk to the resupply convoys supporting U.S. forces, military 
airdrops become the safer way to get fuel and other supplies into remote military 
outposts. While these airdrops avoid putting ground forces in danger with 
unnecessarily risky convoys, the financial costs associated aerial resupply to 
austere areas is significantly higher. 
E. STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND RISKS 
There are strategic challenges and risks involved with obtaining energy in 
a theater of operation. Overseas Contingency Operations are, by definition, 
operations that occur outside of the United States. Domestic energy supply 
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sources and domestic refining capacity can do little, if anything, to support U.S. 
forces abroad. DOD must rely upon energy and logistics interoperability with 
regional allies and partners, and have the ability to integrate with the global 
logistics infrastructure, in order to achieve the goals of the National Military 
Strategy. It is acknowledged that DOD will continue to purchase energy overseas 
in order to “simplify our supply chains, limit costs, and increase flexibility for the 
warfighter” (Energy Security and Research, 2014). 
The pivot or rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region necessitates a far greater 
reliance upon air and sea mobility and coping with extraordinarily long lines of 
communication (LOC). As a geographic Combatant Command, the United States 
Pacific Command (USPACOM) has an assigned area of responsibility (AOR) that 
spans from the western coast of the United States to the western coast of India, 
encompassing 36 diverse nations and half of the earth’s surface (USPACOM, 
n.d.). U.S. forces must be able to overcome the tyranny of distance in the 
USPACOM AOR by first employing its naval and air power, which are also 
subject to the disruption of fuel supply lines. U.S. forces operating within 
USPACOM AOR face risks from a wide range of anti-access and area denial 
(A2/AD) capabilities with the potential to disrupt the energy supply-chain. These 
A2/AD risks are markedly different and more capable than interdiction threats 
within the USCENTCOM AOR (DOD, 2016, p. 7). 
F. OPERATIONAL ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS IN REQUIREMENTS 
AND ACQUISITION 
Weapons systems have characteristically evolved over time in response to 
operational needs and in an effort to gain a margin of superiority over a potential 
threat. Advances in weapons systems capabilities such as lethality, speed, 
payload, and force protection measures have typically resulted in larger, heavier, 
and more sophisticated platforms as shown in Figure 4. The second-order effect 
of a platform’s increased size, weight, or complexity is the requirement for 
additional operational energy. 
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Figure 4.  Military Vehicle Weights 
As recently as May 2011 the Deputy Secretary of Defense acknowledged 
that DOD treated operational energy as a “commodity that will always be readily 
available, regardless of the strategic, operational, and tactical costs” 
(ASD(OEPP), 2011, introduction). Consequently, relatively few of the major 
weapons systems in use today have taken into account the ramifications of 
operational energy dependency.  
Until recently, the processes by which DOD defined its warfighter 
requirements and acquired its weapons systems often placed a greater priority 
on performance at the expense of efficiency. It was the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) in 2001 that first noted in their findings that the performance benefits of 
efficient weapons platforms “are not valued or emphasized in the DOD 
requirements and acquisition processes” (DSB, 2001, p. 65). Many next 
generation weapons systems have been shown to be more energy intensive than 
their predecessors. For example, real world data has shown that the turbine-
powered M1 Abrams third-generation main battle tank consumes roughly four 
times the fuel of the M60 tank that it replaced (JASON, 2006, p. 41). And 
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although the AH-64 Apache achieves greater lethality and performance 
compared to the AH-1 Cobra that it replaced, it also weighs twice as much and 
has approximately twice the rate of fuel consumption. 
 For existing platforms the power demands of additional onboard mission 
equipment such as advanced sensor payloads and communication systems may 
inadvertently generate additional power loads on the platform, resulting in the 
need for more fuel. Concept of operations (CONOPS) can also drive an increase 
in fuel demand. The need for soldiers at the platoon and company levels to 
rapidly exchange digital information (data and images) with their battalion and 
brigade headquarters, as well as track friendly and enemy locations, requires 
advanced networking radio systems. Integrating high-bandwidth networking 
services into tactical vehicles inevitably leads to continuous radio system 
operation and the undesirable continuous idling of engines. 
Although operational performance considerations will always take priority 
over energy efficiency in major weapons systems, gone are the days when the 
far-reaching effects of high levels of fuel consumption can be disregarded by the 
DOD requirements and acquisition communities. Weapons systems cannot 
simply be fielded with the responsibility falling to the end user to employ creative 
techniques to manage fuel consumption. The efficiency of a weapons system 
must be “designed-in” as part of the requirements and development processes. 
Inefficient, energy intensive weapons systems create a burden on the logistics 
system and every operational energy dollar saved can be used to provide 
additional warfighting capabilities elsewhere. Moving forward, DOD must 
continue to evolve its forces and capabilities with energy usage and energy 
logistical support requirements playing a central role in its decision-making and 
business processes. 
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III. HOW HAVE THE BROADER OE INITIATIVE, GUIDANCE, 
AND POLICIES EVOLVED? 
This chapter provides an examination of select operational energy related 
studies, national energy legislation, and guidance that have been issued over the 
course of the last 15 years in order to examine the key contribution of each study 
and strategy towards the management of operational energy. This chronological 
perspective on the still-evolving operational energy management area illustrates 
where policy formulation and implementation were applied to factor energy into 
the acquisition decision-making process and improve the energy related 
characteristics of platforms and weapons systems. To conduct this review, 
various sources were searched to locate published information on the topics of 
military fuel efficiency, military energy security, and operational energy initiatives. 
Targeted internet searches were undertaken to find relevant information on these 
topics, such as conference presentations, Defense Science Board reports and 
applicable policy directives. 
A. OE TIMELINE — STUDIES, STRATEGIES, AND POLICIES 
There were several actions and studies that occurred that led to the 
development of the Operational Energy Strategy (OES). This section will address 
the various strategies and policies that led to this overarching strategy.   
1. 2001 Defense Science Board Report Summary 
The 1999 memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (OUSD[AT&L]) to the Chairman of the 
Defense Science Board (DSB) requested that a task force be formed to study 
and report on technologies that improve the fuel efficiency of land, air, and naval 
platforms. This DSB Task Force, formed for the purpose of improving fuel 
efficiency of weapons platforms, ultimately published its findings in a January 
2001 report titled More Capable Warfighting through Reduced Fuel Burden. In 
addition to identifying numerous technologies with the potential to improve 
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military energy performance, the 2001 DSB report represents the first effort to 
characterize institutional barriers that result in the fielding of inefficient weapons 
platforms and the resulting high demand for operational energy. Because of its 
findings and recommendations, this 2001 DSB report is often cited in subsequent 
studies related to military fuel efficiency and operational energy. 
During the course of their study, the DSB Task Force uncovered systemic 
problems in how DOD goes about the business of acquiring weapons systems 
and this is reflected in its overall findings and recommendations. The DSB Task 
Force concluded that the issues associated with high levels of operational fuel 
consumption can be both directly and indirectly attributed to inadequacies in the 
requirements-setting and acquisition processes. Specifically, the 2001 DSB Task 
Force made the following summarized findings in their report. 
a. Finding 1: Fuel efficiency is not valued or emphasized in the 
DOD requirements and acquisition processes 
The DSB Task Force found that DOD frequently placed the most 
importance on operational performance and reliability when acquiring weapons 
systems, overlooking the substantial operational benefits that could be achieved 
through greater efficiency. Combat effectiveness improvements, such as 
extended range or higher endurance, can be realized by fielding systems with 
reduced fuel demand with the additional benefit of less reliance on forward 
arming and refueling points. The DSB Task Force also noted that DOD did not 
possess the analytical means to quantify the contribution of energy efficiency to 
mission performance or what efficiency provided in terms of reductions in 
logistics requirements. Finally, the DSB Task Force determined that the 
establishment of an energy-related key performance parameter (KPP) was 
needed to drive energy efficiency improvements, and that this KPP should be 
explicitly included in the requirements documents for all platforms. 
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b. Finding 2: The true cost of fuel is not factored into decision-
making 
The commodity price of fuel is the direct price that the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) pays to purchase a gallon of fuel. The DSB Task Force found that 
DOD’s acquisition processes had historically only considered the DLA commodity 
price of fuel, ignoring the true cost of fuel as delivered in an operational 
environment. The unavoidable indirect costs associated with the transportation, 
storage, and protection of fuel had not been factored into DOD’s decision-
making. These indirect costs associated with the protection and transportation of 
fuel to forward operating locations, combined with the commodity price of fuel, 
results in the true delivered cost of fuel for the military also known as the Fully 
Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF). The FBCF can easily be several times higher 
than the artificially low commodity price of fuel. If the FBCF is not understood, 
then total ownership costs of a weapons system cannot be calculated and the 
burden to the military’s logistics infrastructure cannot be assessed. Also in the 
case of existing systems, it is unlikely the case can be made for efficiency 
upgrades (such as turbine engine retrofits) if only the commodity price of fuel is 
considered during cost-benefit analyses. The DSB Task Force also noted that 
DOD lacked the analytical tools and techniques necessary to adequately perform 
FBCF analysis. 
c. Finding 3: Resource allocation and accounting processes do 
not reward fuel efficiency or penalize inefficiency 
The DSB Task Force found that DOD had no means of measuring or 
quantifying the benefits of managing fuel consumption of weapons systems, 
therefore fuel efficiency had no significant influence in resource allocation. This 
inability to quantify fuel efficiency benefits precluded DOD from employing 
mechanisms to serve as either positive or negative reinforcement on the 
institutional practices of the acquisition community. Therefore, the planning, 
programming, and budgeting system (now known as PPBE) could not be used to 
ensure that appropriate initiatives to achieve efficiency were programmed, 
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budgeted, or executed. The DSB Task Force also found that DOD’s present 
energy efficiency efforts were primarily limited to achieving compliance with 
existing federal mandates and executive orders regarding energy use by 
installations and non-tactical vehicle fleets. At the time none of the existing 
federal energy mandates or executive orders was articulated in terms of military 
operational energy, therefore DOD had no real mandates to address or reduce 
its operational energy usage. 
d. Finding 4: Fuel requirements modeling is not linked to 
requirements development or acquisition program processes 
Finding 4 speaks to the lack of a standardized role that fuel logistics 
played in DOD war-gaming and analytical modeling, which ultimately contributed 
to inefficient energy usage during operations. Because DOD was not considering 
the total cost associated with supplying fuel to its forces, it could not integrate this 
energy information into its war-gaming activities. Therefore, DOD could not 
estimate the logistics reductions that could be realized by more efficient platforms 
(such as less demand for fuel) or the potential reduction in total platforms on the 
battlefield (such as fuel trucks). The DSB Task Force also reasoned that if DOD 
treated energy as a resource constraint during its campaign modeling and war-
gaming processes, it would help uncover the impacts to battlefield fuel logistics 
and vulnerabilities to the fuel supply chain. Knowledge of fuel logistics 
vulnerabilities could then be utilized to mitigate these risks before they occur on 
the battlefield. 
e. Finding 5: High payoff, fuel-efficient technologies exist now 
(i.e., 2001) to improve warfighting (operational) effectiveness 
And finally, the DSB Task Force reviewed the availability of existing 
technologies to improve platform fuel efficiency. The DSB Task Force determined 
there were existing technologies that, if leveraged for use by DOD weapons 
systems, would incrementally reduce operational energy demand. The DSB Task 
Force took a look at previous studies such as the B-52 re-engining study which 
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showed the potential to reduce USAF tanker force structure requirements. But 
because of DOD’s inability to properly evaluate the future paybacks of increased 
energy efficiency and the contribution to overall operational effectiveness, the 
economic case for re-engining the B-52 was not made and near term costs 
concerns prevailed. Only by fully understanding the true cost of fuel is it possible 
to propose economically feasible modifications, conversions, and upgrades to 
fuel intensive weapons systems. 
From its findings, the DSB Task Force (2001) formulated five principle 
recommendations for how DOD can manage the challenges and risks associated 
with fuel intensive systems: 
• Recommendation 1: Base investment decisions on the true cost of 
delivered fuel and on warfighting benefits. 
• Recommendation 2: Link warfighting capability and fuel logistics 
requirements through war-gaming and new analytical tools. 
• Recommendation 3: Provide leadership that incentivizes fuel 
efficiency throughout DOD. 
• Recommendation 4: Specifically target fuel efficiency improvements 
through S&T investment and systems designs. 
• Recommendation 5: Explicitly include fuel efficiency in 
requirements and acquisition processes. (DSB, 2001, pp. 73–81) 
These five DSB Task Force recommendations for improving the fuel 
efficiency of weapons platforms can be summed up as follows: Substantial 
financial cost, vulnerabilities, and operational constraints result from the 
consumption, transportation, and protection of fuel (operational energy) on the 
battlefield. These are all critical considerations, which must be factored into the 
requirements development and acquisition decision-making processes for DOD 
weapons systems. 
2. 2007 AT&L Memo on FBCF 
In early 2007 the President of the United States issued Executive Order 
(EO) 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation 
 20 
Management, a mandate addressing the government’s energy consumption. EO 
13423 established goals for federal energy efficiency and instructed all agencies 
to conduct their energy-related activities in a manner that is economical, efficient, 
and sustainable. In direct response to EO 13423, OUSD [AT&L] released the 
2007 AT&L policy memorandum (Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel Pilot Program), 
which stated, “It is Department of Defense (DOD) policy to include the fully 
burdened cost of delivered energy in trade-off analyses conducted for all tactical 
systems with end items that create a demand for energy and to improve the 
energy efficiency of those systems, consistent with mission requirements and 
cost effectiveness” (OUSD [AT&L], 2007). At the time, the implementation of the 
FBCF cost estimating methodology and calculations as a direct contributor to a 
program’s Total Ownership Cost (TOC) had yet to be fully developed. Three 
programs were identified by OSD [AT&L] to serve as pilot programs to aid in 
FBCF cost estimation methods and standards development. This OSD [AT&L] 
FBCF memorandum also prompted issuance of new DOD instruction (DODI), 
5000.02, calling for an FBCF analysis to be conducted as part of the Analysis of 
Alternatives (AOA), Material Solution Analysis phase, of the Defense Acquisition 
System process (Dubbs, 2011, pp. 5–6). 
3. 2008 Defense Science Board Report 
A 2006 memorandum from OUSD [AT&L] to the Chairman of the DSB 
requested that a second task force be formed to “find opportunities to reduce 
DOD’s energy demand, identify institutional obstacles to their implementation, 
and assess their potential commercial and security benefits to the nation” (DSB, 
2008). This DSB task force ultimately published its findings in a February 2008 
report titled More Fight – Less Fuel. Overall, this follow-up to its 2001 study 
presented similar findings to those found in its first study. The DSB final report 
concluded that DOD’s operations suffer from “unnecessarily high and growing 
battlespace fuel demand” that “compromises operational capability and mission 
success.” This conclusion formed the basis of several of the DSB Task Force’s 
findings and recommendations. To put the DSB Task Force findings in context, it 
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is worth noting that the timing of this 2008 report coincides with peaking in-
country troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan (peak troop level for both wars was 
reached in FY2008 at 187,900 uniformed military members on ground) (Belasco, 
2009, p. 9). The 2008 DSB Task Force converged on six key findings, with the 
following three findings determined to be of most relevance to this chapter: 
a. Finding 1: Recommendations from the 2001 DSB Task Force 
Report have not been implemented 
The 2008 DSB Task Force observed that the recommendations from its 
previous study on military fuel efficiency had not been adopted by the DOD 
community and confirmed that those previous findings and recommendations 
were still valid. Specifically, the DSB Task Force found that DOD had made little 
progress toward establishment of an energy efficiency key performance 
parameter (KPP) to address the demand for fuel in mobility platforms. The DSB 
Task Force (2008) also noted that DOD still needed to develop and implement a 
fully burdened cost of fuel methodology to better inform its acquisition investment 
decisions (DSB, 2008, p. 3). 
b. Finding 2: DOD lacks the strategy, policies, metrics, 
information, and governance structure necessary to properly 
manage energy risks 
The absence of strategic energy governance was a key theme in the 2008 
DSB’s report. DOD did not have a coherent and unifying operational energy 
strategy and lacked the policies and resource oversight to focus its disparate 
energy initiatives. DOD also lacked a designated central authority to oversee the 
implementation of a comprehensive department-wide energy strategy. The lack 
of a DOD-wide authority providing oversight of the Department’s operational 
energy strategy hindered progress and was deemed to be the root cause of 
DOD’s energy problem (DSB, 2008, p. 6). Focused leadership, to prioritize, 
coordinate, and advocate for energy initiatives, was seen as a key driver 
necessary for effective implementation of the Department’s operational energy 
strategy. 
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c. Finding 3: Energy efficient technologies are available now but 
they are undervalued, resulting in slow implementation and 
inadequate Science and Technology (S&T) investments 
The 2008 DSB report revealed again that its previous recommendations 
had not resulted in any changes within DOD. The DSB Task Force reiterated that 
existing and emerging technologies are available now to achieve greater energy 
efficiency while increasing combat effectiveness in the theater. But its findings 
indicated that DOD still lacked the expertise (tools and methods) to 
systematically evaluate the long-term economic and operational benefits of 
potential energy efficiency gains. This meant science and technology investment 
opportunities could not be well understood by risk-adverse senior civilian and 
military leadership, hampering the adoption of cost-effective technologies (DSB, 
2008, p. 64). 
The DSB (2008) offered five specific recommendations for its key findings, 
three of which are relevant to this chapter: 
• Recommendation 1: Accelerate efforts to implement energy 
efficiency Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and use the Fully 
Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) 
• Recommendation 2: Establish a DOD strategic plan that 
establishes measurable goals, achieves the business process 
changes recommended by the 2001 DSB report and establishes 
clear responsibility and accountability 
• Recommendation 3: Invest in energy efficient and alternative 
energy technologies to a level commensurate with their operational 
and financial value. (DSB, 2008, pp. 65–71) 
4. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (DH NDAA), 
enacted into public law by Congress in October 2008, levied several important 
mandates upon DOD with the express purpose of improving the way DOD 
manages operational energy. This legislation directed DOD to consider fuel 
logistics support requirements in its program planning, required capabilities 
determination, and acquisition processes. In particular, the DH NDAA reinforced 
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the need for DOD to implement an energy efficiency KPP and FBCF analysis on 
fuel consuming systems in order to manage energy costs and operational 
impacts. Section 332, paragraph (g) of the DH NDAA provided a legal definition 
of FBCF as “the commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and 
assets required to move and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the point at 
which the fuel is received from the commercial supplier to the point of use” 
(Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act, 2008). 
Previously, the 2008 DSB report concluded that no single individual had 
ultimate responsibility for all aspects of DOD’s energy policy or championing its 
energy initiatives (DSB, 2008, p. 6). In response to this lack of a strategic change 
agent, the DH NDAA directed DOD to establish a Director of Operational Energy 
Plans and Programs position (essentially an “Operational Energy Czar”) to 
provide the strategic leadership influence necessary to bolster the energy 
security of the services. This position, which became known as the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD(OEPP)) 
(which was later reorganized into Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 
Installations, and Environment ASD(EI&E)) was tasked with promoting “the 
energy security of military operations through guidance for and oversight of 
Departmental activities and investments” (ASD (OEPP), 2011, introduction). 
The DH NDAA also directed DOD to develop and implement an 
operational energy strategy to guide the Department in how to better use energy 
resources to support its strategic goals while simultaneously supporting National 
energy security goals. DOD would be required to update this operational energy 
strategy every five years. Finally, the DH NDAA included a requirement for DOD 
to submit an annual report to Congress detailing progress made on the 
implementation of the unifying operational energy strategy. 
In summary, the Duncan Hunter NDAA mandated that DOD: 
• Calculate the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) for use in 
acquisition decisions 
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• Provide leadership to the department and armed services for 
operational energy plans and programs 
• Devise and implement an operational energy strategy 
• Submit reports to Congress on operational energy management 
initiatives and progress 
5. 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a statutorily mandated 
document outlining DOD’s strategy and priorities, directed the services to 
incorporate operational energy considerations into their force development, 
warfighting capabilities determination process, and during acquisition processes, 
highlighting that energy efficiency serves as a force multiplier (DOD, 2010, p. 87). 
Specifically, it mandated that the services “will fully implement the statutory 
requirement for the energy efficiency Key Performance Parameters and fully 
burdened cost of fuel set forth in the 2009 NDAA” (DOD, 2010, p. 87). The 2010 
QDR also advanced the concept of military energy security as critical element of 
national security. The QDR defined military energy security as “assured access 
to reliable supplies of energy” and acknowledged that a reduction in energy 
consumption also serves as a means to achieving greater military energy 
security (DOD, 2010, p. 87). 
B. COMPARISON OF THE 2011 OE STRATEGY TO THE 2016 OE 
STRATEGY 
This section will provide an introduction to the comparison of the 2011 OE 
strategy to the 2016 OE Strategy. 
1. 2011 OE Strategy 
With the strategic guidance from the 2010 QDR serving its foundation, 
ASD(OEPP) published its initial operational energy strategy. Released in 2011 as 
Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy, this document set the 
overall direction for operational energy security for the DOD and the services and 
satisfied the statutory requirements of Title 10 U.S.C. § 2926(b). The purpose of 
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the strategy was to guide the strategic use of energy in current and future 
operations, reduce the risks associated with energy-intensive operations, and 
provide a cost savings to the American taxpayer. A three-pillar approach was 
outlined in the Operational Energy Strategy with the following high-level 
outcomes: 
• More fight, less fuel: Reduce the demand for energy in military 
operations 
• More options, less risk: Expand and secure the supply of energy to 
military operations 
• More capability, less cost: Build energy security into the future 
force. (ASD (OEPP), 2011, p. 1) 
These objectives were intended to result in the coherent reduction in 
operational energy demand, improvements in combat effectiveness, and 
reduction in military mission risks by less frequent refueling and reduced 
vulnerability of supply lines. 
OEPP published the Operational Energy Strategy’s corresponding 
Implementation Plan (OESIP) in March 2012. This more detailed and 
comprehensive implementation plan was a necessary follow-up to the generally 
vague Operational Energy Strategy. The OESIP assigned responsibilities for key 
tasks and specified milestones and reporting requirements to the services, 
providing accountability and converting the strategy into action. 
2. 2016 OE Strategy 
The U.S. policy shift to the Asia-Pacific region, referred to as the pivot (or 
rebalance) to Asia, is in response to China’s rising regional influence and 
expansionist foreign policy. To address this shift in policy, the 2014 QDR directed 
the services to prepare for an array of new security challenges as it DOD shifts 
additional capability and greater military capacity towards the USPACOM 
Theater. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations 
and Environment) (OASD(EI&E)) released an updated operational energy 
strategy within the context of the shift to the Asia-Pacific region. The recently 
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approved 2016 Operational Energy Strategy acknowledged that committing more 
military resources to the Asia-Pacific region necessitated a relook of the 
operational energy priorities first published by ASD(OEPP) in 2011. The 2016 
version of the Operational Energy Strategy recognizes that the availability of 
operational energy will continue to present a challenge for U.S. power projection, 
and continues to view efficiency through the lens of military utility and operational 
effectiveness. Because of the inherently long distances associated with operating 
within the Asia-Pacific region, DOD acknowledges it is facing an increased 
reliance upon on naval fleets and aviation, which require more fuel than the 
ground-oriented operations in the USCENTCOM Theater. Also, potential 
adversaries in the Asia-Pacific region have the ability to employ sophisticated 
anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which can threaten the assured 
delivery of energy to U.S. forces. In order to meet these new and enduring 
operational energy challenges, the 2016 strategy states DOD will pursue the 
following broad objectives: 
• Increase future warfighting capability by including energy 
throughout future force development 
• Identify and reduce logistics and operational risks from operational 
energy vulnerabilities 
• Enhance the mission effectiveness of the current force through 
updated equipment and improvements in training, exercises, and 
operations (OASD EI&E), 2016, p. 10) 
The 2016 Operational Energy Strategy asserts that DOD has steadily 
improved its understanding of the operational energy domain in order to ensure 
the warfighter has the energy necessary to perform critical global missions. One 
of the ways DOD has accomplished this is through improved analytical capability 
to better understand the implications of energy use in force development. To 
achieve the first objective of the 2016 Operational Energy strategy, DOD 
recognizes the services must continue to institutionalize Energy Supportability 
Analyses (ESA) early in the required capabilities determination and acquisition 
processes. ESAs were first mandated by the FY2015 NDAA Joint Explanatory 
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Statement, which directed DOD to consider the operational impact of energy 
logistics through the conduct of an energy supportability analysis. An ESA 
facilitates the identification of energy shortfalls and is used to inform the Energy 
Key Performance Parameter, which is now being enforced for all energy 
consuming military systems. 
The 2016 Operational Energy Strategy also affirms that DOD is committed 
to develop and acquire the technologies that improve the long-term energy 
performance of weapons platforms. These technologies may include better or 
new means of propulsion such as advanced turbine engines. The strategy also 
addresses improvements to the operational energy performance of existing 
equipment, particularly systems that consume significant amounts of energy and 
are fielded in sufficient numbers. DOD’s progress in achieving its strategy 
objectives will be monitored using existing mechanisms, such as the annual 
PPBE cycle, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Defense Acquisition 
Board process. 
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IV. MATURING PLANS, PROCESSES, AND MECHANISMS 
WITHIN THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM AND THE DESIRED EFFECT 
Is the Operational Energy strategy gaining traction?  Operational energy is 
defined in law as, “the energy required for training, moving, and sustaining 
military forces and weapons platforms for military operations. The term includes 
energy used by tactical power systems and generators and weapons platforms” 
(DOD, 2016, p. 3).  We intended to identify areas of strength and weakness 
within the DOD acquisition process that highlight a strategic shift in policy, and 
more importantly a shift in actual practice or progress by the United States 
military services. We started our analysis with a new Army program, as an 
example that the OE strategy appears to be gaining traction. Then we reviewed 
the major acquisition law, regulations, policy and guides to assess if the OE 
strategy has made its way into these key documents.   
A. DESIGNING FUEL EFFICIENCY TO REDUCE FUEL CONSUMPTION: 
U.S. ARMY IMPROVED TURBINE ENGINE PROGRAM (ITEP) 
The U.S. Army is making progress in the aviation community that should 
significantly reduce its reliance on fuel while filling noted capability gaps within 
the Army helicopter fleet. The Army states that its Improved Turbine Engine (ITE) 
shall replace all engines currently fielded in U.S. Army Black Hawks, H-60, and 
Apaches, AH-64, shown in Figure 5. It highlights in the ITE Acquisition Strategy 
that the ITE shall be a form, fit replacement for the T700 General Electric series 
engine (701D), so that the new engine can fit within the existing engine 
compartments of both the H-60 and AH-64E (Program Executive Officer, 
Aviation, 2015, p. 9). Moreover, the new ITE shall provide significantly more 
power (i.e., 3000 Shaft Horse Power) while reducing fuel consumption and 
decreasing sustainment costs. The ITE Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) was 
approved in June 2014 and the Acquisition Strategy approved in August 2015.   
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Figure 5.  ITEP-equipped Aircraft as a Percentage of Total Army Aircraft. 
Source: Program Executive Officer, Aviation (2016). 
The ITE program office successfully completed the Milestone A review 
with the Army Acquisition Executive and the Army Requirements Oversight 
Council (AROC) with the Chief of Staff of the Army in the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2016. The ITE Program now enters into the technology maturation and risk 
reduction (TMRR) acquisition life-cycle phase in an effort to identify and leverage 
existing technologies to improve performance, of course, but also reduce fuel 
consumption, in response to the new E-KPP. Figure 6 depicts the DOD 
acquisition life-cycle phasing/milestone summary. The Army Acquisition Product 
Manager for the ITE can now award two contracts to produce preliminary engine 
designs to achieve the 25% “Objective” Energy-Fuel efficiency requirement.  
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Figure 6.  Model 1, Hardware Intensive Program. Source: OUSD(AT&L) 
(2015), p. 9. 
Complex design efforts typically include tradeoff analysis and selection of 
the best value solution, balancing performance with cost and other key factors. It 
is important to note that there are second-order effects to changing propulsion 
and energy systems within already fielded systems, like the Army plans to do 
with Black Hawks and Apaches. Retrofitting an older engine with a new, more 
powerful, and higher fuel efficiency rated engine may seem simple on the 
surface, yet in practical terms be highly complex and costly. The average fuel 
consumption will be reduced in most operational environments, but will total 
ownership costs (TOC) for Army Aviation be reduced?  As shown in Figure 7, for 
legacy aircraft such as Apaches and Black Hawks, which were designed for 
lower shaft horsepower (SHP) engines (2000-SHP General Electric T700s), the 
TOC might go up due to a more the powerful engine causing additional stress, 
strain, and fatigue on a legacy fuselage, drive system, and support components. 
These higher forces may reduce the life of some legacy aircraft components, 
commonly referred to as flight safety parts that were designed for lower forces 
and less stress. Many aircraft parts have a designed fatigue life. Once a part has 
reached its usable life, then aviation maintenance planners are required to 
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replace worn-out parts to ensure reliability and safety standards. Further detailed 
design and cost analysis will be required to understand the effects of these 
different forces and determine if redesign efforts are required on these legacy 
components. There are also potential cost increases in the operations and 
support (O&S) acquisition life cycle phase, because maintenance personnel may 
have to replace these components more often due to the increased forces 
exerted by the higher SHP engine propulsion systems. This example drives 
home the need for high-fidelity fully burdened cost of energy (FBCE) modeling 
and simulations to accurately inform decision makers of holistic total-life of the 
system TOC estimations.  
   
Figure 7.  ITE Analysis of Alternatives. Source: Army Material Systems 
Analysis Activity (2014). 
Overall, the Army’s Improved Turbine Engine Program appears to be a 
success story in the making, because the Army is implementing the new Energy 
Key Performance Parameter (E-KPP) that will reduce fuel consumption or 
demand in 2,825 Army legacy aircraft.   
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B. FULLY BURDENED COST OF ENERGY 
Fully Burdened Cost of Energy is defined and explained in U.S. Law Title 
10 U.S.C. § 2911. A Defense Acquisition University reference, Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), website chapter 3.1.6, summarizes FBCE as a 
holistic or systematic attempt to capture as many costs as possible, related to the 
fuel supply chain, including the cost of delivery and associated force protection 
requirements as shown in Figure 8. The DAG provides a comprehensive 
description of DOD current thinking and progress toward using FBCE modeling. 
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DOD, 2013) makes the point that the 
expanded use of FBCE modeling is critical to understanding weapon system 
effectiveness and total costs in a wartime scenario as measured in dollars, 
distance, and lives (p. 15). 
Figure 8.  FBCE Fuel Delivery Process Diagram. Source: DOD (2013), 
Section 3.1.6. 
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C. EVOLUTION OF THE DOD ACQUISITION SYSTEM TO SUPPORT 
GREATER VISIBILITY AND SENSITIVITY TO ENERGY AND FUEL 
CONSUMPTION 
First, a brief overview should be presented of the three overlapping and 
interdependent systems used by DOD to deliver warfighting capability, as 
reflected in Figure 9. In the “Big A Concept and Graph,” DOD shows three 
principal decision-making support systems. This support system is used by the 
DOD to strategically plan for required capability need assessments, procurement 
of weapon systems, and program resourcing.  
Figure 9.  The “Big A” DOD Decision Support System. Source: Defense 
Acquisition Portal, https://dap.dau.mil, retrieved June 26, 2016. 
The acquisition process as documented in DODI 5000.02 was last 
updated January 7, 2015, and articulates policy for the management of all 
acquisition programs (OUSD(AT&L), 2015). This instruction defines the process, 
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decision milestones, deliverables, oversight, and reporting requirements for all 
DOD acquisition programs. The yellow circle in Figure 9 represents this process. 
Each service has Program Executive Offices organized by common mission 
areas, which are led by a general or flag officer and oversee program offices 
typically led by a colonel or Navy captain. They oversee the execution of the 
system acquisition and perform the major tasks of cost estimation, budget 
development, contracting/procurement, systems design, development, logistics 
support strategy, test, training development, and ultimately fielding of the weapon 
and information management systems.   
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process is documented in CJCSI 3170.01I, dated 23 January 2015. The process 
exists to support the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who have the responsibilities in 
identify, assess, validate, and prioritize joint military capability requirements. The 
red circle in Figure 9 represents this process. The JCIDS instruction notes that 
the output of this process determines system capability requirements which drive 
the acquisition community to deliver a system with those capabilities. The 
Defense Acquisition Portal (DAU, 2016) describes the JCIDS as providing a 
transparent process that allows the JROC and Service Acquisition Requirement 
Councils, like the AROC did for the ITEP, to make decisions on how capabilities 
should be prioritized and validated.  
Per DODD 7045.14, (ODSD,  2013), the planning, programming, 
budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process starts from the President’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS), then the Defense Secretary’s National Military  
Strategy (NMS) and associated policy guidance to dictate the planning phase. 
These high-level documents guide the mid-range programming efforts, led by the 
Director for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE) to identify 
capability gaps and materiel solutions for prioritization and programming. The 
services work closely with the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) to influence 
the president’s annual budget during the budgeting phase. Following 
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Congressional authorization and appropriation actions and presidential 
signatures, the Service Acquisition Executives and Program Executive Officers 
(PEOs), along with their Program Offices, execute defined programs to deliver 
weapon and information management system capabilities to address gaps 
highlighted in the NSS and NMS’s. The blue circle represents the PPBE process 
in Figure 9. 
1. The Evolving Acquisition Management Process — “The Yellow 
Circle” 
Prior to its formal January 2015 release, the last major approved release 
of DODI 5000.02 was December 2008. Enclosure 7, sections 5 and 6, contained 
only two short directives pertaining to energy. The first was for the Director, 
Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPA&E) to ensure the AOA followed their 
study guidance and assessed, “alternative ways to improve the energy efficiency 
of DOD tactical systems with end items that create a demand for energy, 
consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”  The second, 
contained only one sentence, “6. ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS. The fully 
burdened cost of delivered energy shall be used in trade-off analyses conducted 
for all DOD tactical systems with end items that create a demand for 
energy.”(OUSD[AT&L], 2008).  , Enclosure 7, section 6 p. 59)  
The Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy was 
just completing its 2008 report, More Fight Less Fuel.  Thus, DODI 5000.02, the 
key acquisition process document, would not see another update for a full five 
years, until the interim release on November 25, 2013. This update only slightly 
modified the call for AOAs to include, “(g) considers the fully burdened cost of 
energy (FBCE) where FBCE is a discriminator among alternatives” 
((OUSD[AT&L], 2013), enclosure 9, section 2.c(1)(g), p. 123). This statement 
seems to give the impression that when all other factors are equal, then FBCE 
modeling can be used to determine the best course of action. The authors of this 
research report consider this very weak guidance that would have little to no 
effect on behavioral change within the DOD to reduce reliance on fuel. 
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The 2008 DSB report noted two primary challenges: 1) high and growing 
demand for fuel in today’s weapon systems compromises our capabilities, 
threatens supply chain support personnel, and mission success, and 2) that 
installations with heavy reliance on energy and fuel are increasingly vulnerable. 
During a brief to the 2008 DSB task force, Gen James T. Mattis, USMC, said, 
“Unleash us from the tether of fuel” (Bochman, 2008). So the question remains, 
how did this DSB study and other findings and defense reviews influence the 
most recent DODI 5000.02, published in January 2015? 
The January 2015 version of DODI 5000.02 provides four template 
schedule models to generically apply and tailor to a given acquisition program, 
whether hardware or software intensive. The 2015 Instruction gives acquisition 
professionals and decision makers leeway to tailor deliverables and decision 
milestones. The authors of the instruction removed the statement requiring that 
the DPA&E ensure study guidance addressed: “Alternative ways to improve the 
energy efficiency of DOD tactical systems with end items that create a demand 
for energy, consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”  The 
only statement that remains within the latest DODI 5000.02 of January 2015 
pertaining to energy is the same as in the 2008 release, “Consider the fully 
burdened cost of energy (FBCE), where FBCE is a discriminator among 
alternatives” (OUSD[AT&L], 2015). 
It is disappointing that the current DODI 5000.02 does not take into 
account any of the findings or recommendations from the DSB, 2011 Operational 
Energy Strategy, or the 2014 QDR, which states, “Energy improvements 
enhance range, endurance, and agility, particularly in the future security 
environment where logistics may be constrained.” (DOD, 2014).   Also, the NSS 
of February 2015 indicates a global strategic shift to the Pacific region where 
supply chain dynamics (fuel, parts, and personnel) will be that much more 
strained, complex and difficult than the current USCENTCOM area of operations 
(AO). This future challenge supports our concerns that DOD requirements and 
acquisition leadership has to be looking to mitigate these growing risk by 
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reducing our reliance of fossil fuel. Moreover, the 2016 Operational Energy 
Strategy reiterates that operational energy presents an increasing national and 
defense vulnerability as our forces continue to have a greater reliance on fuel 
and are required to operate with longer and more vulnerable supply lines (DOD, 
2016).   
After review of some of the key national strategies, studies, and 
acquisition process documentation, the authors of this report conclude that the 
initiative to reduce reliance on fuel, quite clearly, has not gained tangible traction 
within the acquisition process.   
a. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) 
The CAPE Director and associated team were established in 2009 as part 
of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). The Director, CAPE 
works directly for the Secretary of Defense, and oversees the Programming 
phase of the PPBE, mentioned above. The Director, CAPE is a major player and 
voting member at all Defense Acquisition Boards and major milestone reviews. 
The CAPE organization serves a powerful role since they essentially support 
both the PPBE process and the capability requirements process. At a summary 
level, they serve two primary roles, that of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation. 
(1) Program Evaluation 
Since the WSARA-2009 they have taken the role previously performed by 
the DPA&E, to include the issuance of AOA study guidance. The study guidance 
is crafted prior to the AOA as a set of directions to steer the work of the AOA, 
which is a key activity during Materiel Solution Analysis phase. Results of the 
AOA are reported out to the DAB at MS A. As noted on the CAPE website, the 
CAPE provides independent analysis and advice to the JROC and OSD staff. 
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(2) Cost Assessment 
To ensure the “Big A” had an independent unbiased analysis and cost 
assessment view point, as part of WSARA-2009, all Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) receive a CAPE-developed and approved Independent Cost 
Estimate (ICE) at each major acquisition milestone. The Acquisition Milestone 
Decision Authority will then expect each service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) to 
agree to fund the program to the levels determined by the CAPE ICE. Prior to 
WSARA-2009, the service would provide their own service cost estimate as the 
basis for budget establishment.   
b. Operations and Support Cost Estimating 
It is worth noting that the CAPE’s Operations and Support Cost Estimating 
Guide 2014 provides some information as to how to capture energy cost, but 
makes no mention of Fully Burdened Cost of Energy modeling or methods. It 
bounds or defines the cost estimation method for energy to include fuel, 
petroleum, oil and lubricants solely in peacetime missions. This is a concern 
underscored by the 2016 OE Strategy which encourages the use of FBCE 
calculations and modeling (DOD, 2016). We cannot assume a weapon system 
will remain effective if planning only includes peacetime operations. We find this 
to be a major disconnect in understanding total cost and system vulnerabilities. 
DOD should continue to leverage maturing efforts to understand the true total 
cost of weapon systems in wartime scenarios which can now be captured via 
higher fidelity modeling and simulations. 
2. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) Requirements Process — “The Red Circle” 
We transition from the acquisition process to the JCIDS process, or what 
we will refer to as the “capability requirements process” where user needs and 
gaps are identified in the context of the current National Security Strategy, and 
National Military Strategy. User needs are captured, prioritized, formalized, 
controlled and documented in Initial Capabilities Documents (ICD), Capability 
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Development Documents (CDD), and then Capability Production Documents 
(CPD), which feed and drive the Acquisition System discussed above and shown 
in Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10.  Interaction between JCIDS Capability Requirements Process 
and Acquisition Process. Source: OUSD(AT&L) (2015), p. 5. 
Historically, DOD Program Managers (PMs) working within the Acquisition 
process have not been incentivized or required to address operational energy 
usage and/or reduce fuel consumption while meeting system capability 
requirements documented in the ICD, CDD and CPD. A system would be 
designed within the acquisition process by the PEO/PMs to meet certain Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) established by the requirements community, 
tested for operation effectiveness and suitability, and then fielded. If the system 
consumed fuel at four miles per gallon while meeting key performance 
parameters, then it left the acquisition domain to enter the supply side 
infrastructure. Essentially, deployed forces were/are required to work with the 




Figure 11.  How DOD Needs Fit into the Acquisition Process. 
Source: GAO (2012). 
One challenge which limits the DOD in gaining OE traction is the lack of 
new weapon system program starts due to constrained budgets. Most DOD front 
line weapon systems were designed 20 to 40 years ago. System upgrades and 
modifications typically receive much less oversight than new-start programs. This 
is where the PPBE process could provide greater influence and oversight to 
ensure modification programs, typically funded with procurement dollars, could 
be forced to consider second-order effects to fuel reliance and supply 
infrastructure demands. 
As noted in Chapter III, there have been many attempts to raise 
awareness of this growing issue. As we look at the evolution of the capability 
requirements process, other factors have been at play, such as the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center September 11, 2001, erratic costs of fuel due 
to large swings in fuel supply and demand, increasing threats and vulnerabilities 
of the supply lines in CENTCOM Middle East region, and now the National 
Security Strategy focus shift to the PACOM Asian-Pacific region driven by the 
2014 QDR. All these factors appear to be raising levels of urgency and 
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awareness, but are they urgent enough to effect change in the capability 
requirements process? 
The first time the capability requirements process included any mention of 
the energy efficiency KPP or consideration for Fully Burdened Cost of Energy or 
Fuel is in JCIDS 3170.01, May 2007. The JROC accepted the recommendations 
documented in the JROC Memorandum 161-06, August 17, 2006, which called 
for the inclusion of the E-KPP but only as a “Selectively Applied KPP,” not a 
mandatory KPP. This memo stresses the need for life-cycle cost analysis for 
developing new capabilities, yet says nothing about evolutionary acquisition or 
incremental development. This appears to be shortsighted and supports our 
concern and combined 50 years’ acquisition experience that once a system has 
been fielded, and is in an incremental upgrade and modifications stage of the life 
cycle, program managers are not incentivized or required to reduce reliance on 
fuel.   
The following are the main sections of the JCIDS 3170.01 capability 
requirements process documents from 2007 through 2015 pertaining to energy. 
Although we observe some increased awareness and sensitivity in 2007, it is not 
until 2012 when the requirement became mandatory. The 2015 document is also 
markedly expanded to include large segments solely addressing the issues of 
reliance on fuel, supply chain, cost estimates, wartime planning and demand 
reductions. We have selected key sections in each of the previous versions to 
highlight main content and action points related to energy. 
The authors of this research paper believe that the Duncan Hunter 
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, 10 USC 2911 § 332, was the 
key event to drive real change within the DOD to consider fuel demands, burden 
on the supply chain and costs analysis such as FBCE and FBCF in requirements 
and associated acquisition. 
The CJCSM 3170.01C of May 2007 contained no mandatory KPP or Key 
System Attribute (KSA) for energy or fuel consumption. It states:  
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Include fuel efficiency considerations for fleet purchases and 
operational plans consistent with mission accomplishment. Life-
cycle cost analysis will include the fully burdened cost of fuel during 
the AOA and subsequent analyses and acquisition program design 
trades. The fully burdened cost of fuel includes the price of the fuel 
delivery chain (to include force protection requirements). (p. B-6) 
The CJCSM 3170.01 of Feb 2009 states that the 2009 JCIDS process still 
only notes the energy KPP as “selectively applied” and not mandatory. It states: 
Include fuel efficiency considerations in systems consistent with 
future force plans and approved planning scenarios. Include 
operational fuel demand and related fuel logistics resupply risk 
considerations with the focus on mission success and mitigating the 
size of the fuel logistics force within the given planning scenarios. 
These assessments will inform the setting of targets and thresholds 
for the fuel efficiency of materiel solutions. Consider fuel risk in 
irregular warfare scenarios, operations in austere or concealed 
settings, and other asymmetric environments, as well 
as conventional campaigns [we could not find this paragraph 
in the 2009 version]. 
As noted in CJCSM 3170.01 of Jan 2012, this is the first time the JCIDS 
process lists the Energy KPP as a mandatory performance parameter in materiel 
solutions meeting noted capability gaps. 
The Energy KPP is applicable to all documents addressing systems 
where the provision of energy, including both fuel and electric 
power, to the system impacts operational reach, or requires 
protection of energy infrastructure or energy resources in the 
logistics supply chain. The intent of the Energy KPP is to optimize 
fuel and electric power demand in capability solutions as it directly 
affects the burden on the force to provide and protect critical energy 
supplies. The KPP includes fuel and electric power demand 
considerations in systems, including those for operating “off grid” 
for extended periods when necessary, consistent with future force 
plans and ISCs. The Logistics FCB, in coordination with the Joint 
Staff J-4 / Engineering Division (J-4/ED) and with advice from the 
Defense Energy Board as appropriate, will assess the Energy KPP, 
or Sponsor justification of why the Energy KPP is not applicable, for 
any document with a JSD of JROC or JCB Interest. Additional 
guidance on the Energy KPP is provided in Appendix H to 
this Enclosure. (p. BA-3)
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As noted in CJCSM 3170.01, Feb 2015, the JCIDS process adds an entire 
enclosure F (appendix F), which further clarifies the mandatory KPP beyond the 
2012 guidance. The appendix provides detailed review criteria, requiring conduct 
of an Energy Supportability Analysis, determining proper scope, relevance, clarity 
and measurability. This process has also matured to the point where it arranges 
analytical support from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Energy, Installations, and Environment. The latest JCIDS process notes: 
The Energy KPP is intended to ensure combat capability of the 
force by balancing the energy performance of systems and the 
provisioning of energy to sustain systems/forces required by the 
operational commander under applicable threat environments. The 
Energy KPP includes, but is not limited to, optimizing fuel and 
electric power demand in capability solutions, in the context of the 
logistical supply of energy to the warfighter, as it directly affects the 
burden on the force to provide and protect critical energy supplies. 
The Energy KPP includes both fuel and electric power demand 
considerations in systems, including those for operating ‘off grid’ for 
extended periods when necessary, consistent with SSA products. 
In cases where energy demand reduction is impractical or 
insufficient to align with projected energy supply, complementary 
DOTMLPF-P changes to the energy supply chain must be 
addressed in the document to accommodate the increased energy 
demands and satisfy the Energy KPP. (p. D-A 3, 4) 
The CJCSM JCIDS 3170.01 Feb 2015 shows a great many sections and 
appendices requiring detailed energy analysis and capability trade-offs. The 
authors of this research project believe the 2015 updated process is now driving 
the acquisition community to consider energy demands and the risks and 
vulnerabilities related to its reliance as we see in the Army’s ITEP. It is clear that 
the capability requirements community is now taking energy very seriously. Since 
the acquisition process follows the capability requirements process, it should be 
only a matter of time before weapon systems will evolve to reduce reliance of fuel 
and energy. Yet this may take a long time, given the time it takes to design, test 
and field a complex major system. 
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3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
(PPBE) Funding Process — “The Blue Circle” 
The PPBE is a resource allocation or financial management process used 
within the DOD. This process takes national and military-level strategy and 
combines planning, programming, and budgeting guidance to produce an annual 
budget that is submitted by the President, approved by Congress, and then 
executed by the Military Service PEOs and their program managers as shown in 
Figure 12. The process is documented in DOD Directive 7045.14, January 2013, 
and tightly integrated with the acquisition and capability requirements process as 
discussed above (OSD, 2013). 
  
Figure 12.  PPBE Process Flowchart. Source: AcqNotes (2016). 
We comment above that once a program manager has completed his 
major Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) milestone reviews and enters into full 
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rate production and fielding status, much of the oversight within the acquisition 
process trails off. Yet, year after year the warfighter and capability requirements 
community continue to look for ways to adapt the weapon system to remain 
ready and relevant to meet evolving capability gaps. The program manager 
working with the resource and capability requirements community will request 
additional funds through the PPBE process to modify and adapt their system, or 
risk becoming irrelevant and/or obsolete. National defense is a dynamic 
environment which requires agile and rapid responses to counter enemy tactics, 
and techniques. However, as we highlight in Chapter II, we cannot continue to 
ignore the greater and greater dependency on fuel. The enemy is now exploiting 
this dependency and fuel reliance is becoming a national and system 
vulnerability.   
We assert that most of the front line weapon systems today are well 
beyond their Full Rate Production (FRP) decision and that DOD relies heavily on 
weapon system upgrade and modifications, rather than new program starts. The 
Department needs to look for ways within the PPBE process to incentivize and 
require reductions in fuel reliance and consumption for these modification 
programs. The DOD has stressed for some time the application of evolutionary 
acquisition strategies and incremental development. These approaches have 
been highly successful, yet the PPBE now needs to adapt to this growing 
national fuel vulnerability. 
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V. PROMULGATION AND SYSTEMATIC CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
Merriam-Webster defines promulgate as a verb, which simply means to 
“make an idea or belief known to many people or to make a new law publicly and 
officially known” (“Promulgate,” n.d.)  Because the Operational Energy Strategy 
was conceived, documented, and published as law within the last decade, there 
is a need to promulgate this strategy so that it reaches all the users and 
stakeholders that will eventually be affected by it. The 2011 Operational Energy 
Strategy established the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD(OEPP)). The mission of this 
position is to “promote the energy security of military operations through 
guidance for and oversight of Departmental activities and investments.” 
Therefore, this strategy sets the direction for operational energy security for 
combatant commands, defense agencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), and the DOD components. The initial OES, as published in 2011, 
provided the overarching guidance to all DOD components with the intent that 
the strategy and implementation plan would be updated as the Department 
attained more understanding of current and future operational energy 
consumption (DOD, 2011). 
In 2015, the ASD(OEPP) office and the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Installations and Environment office merged to create the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment (ASD(EI&E)). 
The responsibility of this office includes implementation of the overall OES. The 
first update to the 2011 OES was drafted in December 2015 as a result of 
significant changes in the DOD and new and enduring challenges within the 
operational environment. Additionally, the next generation of weapons platforms 
and concept of operations (CONOPS) have proven to use more energy than their 
respective predecessors. DOD will utilize the Defense Operational Energy Board 
(DOEB), chaired by the Joint Staff/Director for Logistics (JS/J4) and the 
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ASD(EI&E), coupled with the annual PPBE process, to coordinate, review, and 
prioritize activities and ensure that align to the goals and objectives of the OES 
(DOD, 2016). 
Now that DOD has a better understanding of energy use and its 
implications in systems, CONOPS, and operation plans (OPLANs), the 
department is using energy supportability analyses (ESAs) to better support and 
inform the E-KPP required for specific military platforms. The ESA may identify 
changes in the design of a system or of a system’s energy use as well as identify 
changes in logistics capacity, force structure, and CONOPS. This improved 
fidelity in operational and logistical risk identification enables prioritization and 
precision in specific responses and mitigations. The Department is considering 
the requirement of operational energy demands be included in Capabilities-
Based Assessments (CBAs) prior to the development of E-KPPs. This additional 
knowledge of energy constraints will ensure that the Department can make 
better energy-informed decisions (DOD, 2016).  
A. AS IT RELATES TO THE SERVICES 
Each of the Services has developed its own vision and strategic plan for 
reducing operational energy dependence. 
1. Air Force
The 2013 U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan states that the Air Force 
accounts for approximately 48% of the total energy consumption for the 
Department of Defense. As shown in Figure 13, aviation fuel accounts for the 
vast majority. This is comparable to approximately 2.5 billion gallons of fuel for 
aviation and 64 trillion BTUs per year, as well as a significant amount of gas 
emissions. This strategic plan also states that energy costs for the Air Force are 
approximately $9 billion per year. This amount is expected to increase although 
fiscal resources are becoming more constrained (U.S. Air Force, 2013).  
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Figure 13.  Air Force Energy Consumption within the Department of 
Defense. Source: U.S. Air Force (2013). 
The 2013 U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan affirms that the Air Force’s 
Mobility Air Forces (MAF), under the Air Mobility Command (AMC), created the 
Aviation Fuel Efficiency Office (FEO) to lead implementation of improvements to 
aviation fuel conservation. The purpose of the FEO is to carry out the Air Force 
vision for fuel efficiency across its fleet. This strategic plan maintains that all MAF 
personnel are empowered to recommend or suggest ideas on ways that energy 
can be conserved. Consequently, these ideas are given to the proper personnel, 
and presented to the Air Force’s corporate structure. According to this plan, the 
Air Force asserts that efforts to save fuel are focused on six major areas: science 
and technology, planning, policy, maintenance, execution, and fuel-efficient 
aircraft systems. A set of fuel-savings metrics as well as required reporting have 
also been established (U.S. Air Force, 2013).  
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Energy published an article titled “Air 
Force Achieves Fuel Efficiency through Industry Best Practices,” stating that the 
Air Force is collaborating with private industry and with other federal agencies to 
help determine where energy weaknesses exist, identify lessons learned, and put 
potential solutions in place to help improve the service’s current position on 
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energy. Some of the best practices identified in this article include: data capture 
and analysis to highlight fuel reduction opportunities, removal of excess 
equipment and supplies to reduce weight, fuel load planning, flight planning to 
minimize fuel consumption, cost analysis to reduce total operating costs, and 
routine cleaning of engines resulting in reduced maintenance costs and fuel 
consumption. AMC has incorporated all of these methods into its operations. 
Additionally, the article states that the Air Force has included an online repository 
for fuel data collection and reporting called the Wing Dashboard, which all 
personnel within the MAF have access to. The Wing Dashboard contains a 
myriad of metrics to report fuel efficiency for the overall Air Force fleet (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2012).   
In 2015, the Air Force published a fact sheet for Energy Action Month. 
This fact sheet depicts other practical examples underway within the Air Force to 
reduce operational energy which include investing in new technologies such as 
the KC-135 and C-5M propulsion upgrade programs. These programs move 
cargo more efficiently, farther, and in less time, with lower fuel costs and 
maintenance costs. Another example listed in the fact sheet shows that the Air 
Force is applying commercial solutions for aviation such as introducing cost 
index flying into flight planning, fielding speed and altitude optimization, and 
investing in a four dimensional flight planning service for the future. Additionally, 
the Air Force is using a USTRANSCOM program called Agile Transportation for 
the 21st Century to assist logisticians, pilots, and loadmasters by reducing flight 
time and reducing fuel requirements. Figure 14 shows some of the additional 
examples that the Air Force is undertaking to reduce operational energy (U.S. Air 
Force, 2015).   
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Figure 14.  “Do Your Part,” Practical Examples of Air Force Energy 
Reduction Initiatives. Source: U.S. Air Force (2015). 
According to the U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan published in 2013, 
the Air Force is incorporating operational energy initiatives throughout its life 
cycle operations when compared to other services. In order to ensure that energy 
is considered in all things that the Air Force does, this service maintains 
governing bodies across the entire Air Force—at the headquarters level, at all the 
major commands, and at all the installations. The Air Force states that these 
cross-functional governing bodies “provide guidance and oversight, as well as 
evaluate the policies and programs, and resources needed to meet the Air Force 
energy goals and objectives” (U.S. Air Force, 2013). By doing this, the Air Force 
is improving its operational capabilities as well as maximizing fiscal resources. 
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This strategic plan goes on to state that as technology continues to develop and 
resource availability shifts, the Air Force approach to energy will continue to 
evolve. Figure 15 shows that the governing structure is divided into three levels 
and is headed by an Air Force Energy Council (U.S. Air Force, 2013). 
 
Figure 15.  Air Force Energy Governance Structure. Source: U.S. Air 
Force Energy Strategic Plan (2013). 
The 2013 U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan states that the Energy 
Council is responsible for strategic oversight and guidance of addressing the 
energy challenges for the entire Air Force. The Council also identifies, integrates, 
and balances the investments needed to meet the energy goals and objectives. 
Additionally, the plan asserts that the Council is empowered to establish 
organizations and steering groups that focus on specific energy-related issues 
such as aviation operations, planning, energy security, expeditionary energy, 
infrastructure energy, research and development, test and evaluation, and 
outreach. The Air Force produced the Energy Strategic Plan which is the all-
inclusive energy master plan for this service, required by 10 USC § 2911. In 
addition to this plan, the Air Force also develops an implementation plan on an 
annual basis that portrays specific tasks and activities for the approaching 
execution year, as well as reviews the recurring events that are required for this 
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service to attain its energy targets. The last portion of the Air Force’s strategic 
plan is the yearly budget request which serves as the start point for funding the 
activities required to meet the energy goals (U.S. Air Force, 2013). 
2. Navy and Marine Corps 
The Department of the Navy’s Energy Program for Security and 
Independence, published in April 2010, states that the Naval forces require 
energy to fuel all of its operations. Within the DOD, the Department of the Navy 
(DON) accounts for 34% of total energy consumption when compared to the 
other services—the Army and Air Force. Figure 16 shows the consumption 
across all domains—aviation, maritime, shore, and expeditionary domains (U.S. 
Department of the Navy, 2010). 
 
Figure 16.  Energy Consumption across all DON Domains. Source: U.S. 
Department of the Navy (2010). 
The DON’s Energy Program for Security and Independence (2010) is 
made up of five elements intended to drive specific actions to meeting the goals 
set forth by the Secretary of the Navy. These elements are: 
• Strategic Partnerships 
• Energy Management 
• Energy Efficient Acquisition 
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• Science and Technology 
• Behavioral Change 
The DON’s energy program asserts that the Secretary of the Navy plans to take 
crucial steps such as requiring energy as a factor in the award of new contracts 
as well as contemplate the amount of energy contractors use as part of the 
overall acquisition process, which is currently not being done. For tactical 
systems, the DON’s energy program states that the Marine Corps and Navy plan 
to incorporate the FBCF methodology in determining energy life-cycle costs and 
utilize the E-KPP to set the energy demand for new systems as well as optimize 
operational effectiveness. The DON has established a governing structure for 
energy management across the Naval enterprise and is shown in Figure 17. The 
DON affirms that this structure sets forth the roles for PPBE as well as a 
reporting structure for policy and function implementation within the DON (U.S. 
Department of the Navy, 2010). 
 
Figure 17.  DON Energy Management Governance Structure. Source: 
U.S. Department of the Navy (2010). 
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According to the DON’s Energy Program for Security and Independence 
(2010), the DON realizes that developing and utilizing advanced technologies is 
important to reach all of the energy goals set forth. The DON is partnering with 
other agencies, laboratories, and universities and working with industry to 
accelerate advanced technologies, mature and validate new technologies, and 
investigate other technologies that may disrupt the existing market. The program 
affirms that the DON is investing in maritime advancement of new engines with 
innovative technologies. The DON’s Energy Program also states that the Hybrid 
Electric Drive (HED) technology will improve the way Naval ships operate, by 
allowing them to move at slower speeds without utilizing the ship’s primary 
engines, resulting in the use of less energy. Additionally, the Incentivized Energy 
Conservation Program (i-ENCON) and Smart Voyage Planning software will 
permit the Naval personnel to utilize energy planning as a better approach to 
conserving energy. The DON is also developing improvements to its engines in 
aircraft in order to reduce the amount of fuel used.  (U.S. Department of the 
Navy, 2010). 
The article “Navy Energy Vision for the 21st Century,” published in 2010, 
states that one of the primary energy efficiency initiatives for Naval aviation is the 
use of training simulators. This technology allows more training and readiness to 
be realized and provides superior training at reduced cost and risk. Additionally, 
Naval and Marine Corps Air Stations have achieved savings by using fuel trucks, 
during refueling of aircraft, instead of hot skids. Fuel savings have also been 
realized by certification of aircraft to operate at higher altitudes. According to the 
article, these higher altitudes are set aside for commercial airliners, which are 
more efficient. Naval aviation is evaluating current technological solutions such 
as improved turbine and compressor designs to improve energy performance 
and efficiency in currently fielded systems. Additionally, the article states that 
Naval aviation is also looking into drag-resistant aircraft coatings after 
demonstrating fuel savings in the commercial world. On the expeditionary side, 
the Navy is exploring fuel efficiency upgrades to mobility platforms such as the 
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Landing Craft Air Cushion which is expected to result in fuel savings up to 10%. 
Like other services and DOD, the Navy is looking to incorporate a FBCF to 
account for total cost of procuring and supplying fuel to various deployed 
platforms. Moreover, the article also states that the DON is also looking into 
different mechanisms to enforce energy efficiency considerations for the defense 
industry (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2010). 
The DON’s Energy Program for Security and Independence (2010) states 
that the DON’s overarching goal is to develop projects that allow them to meet 
the energy goals set forth by the Secretary of the Navy and comply with all DOD 
policy directives, executive orders, and statutory mandates. The DON plans to 
pursue innovative financing mechanisms and funding arrangements to offset the 
high costs for emerging energy technologies. This Energy Program also states 
that the DON plans to partner with the Department of Energy, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, state energy offices, regional energy offices, other 
federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other utility service 
providers to exchange energy information, explore incentives, and leverage 
resources in order to construct and execute its energy program (U.S. Department 
of the Navy, 2010).  
3. Army 
In the briefing “The Army Energy and Sustainability Program,” Mr. Richard 
Kidd (n.d.) states that the Army has “historically undervalued energy and energy 
security” and “unintentionally treated energy as a free good” (p. 5). Kidd, the 
deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability, goes on to 
assert that the Army acknowledges reducing fuel demand will expand capability, 
reduce logistical burdens, and save lives. In 2012, the G-4 Public Affairs 
published an article titled “Army Launches Smart Operational Energy Use 
Campaign, Identifies 10 Initiatives.” This article states that the Army secretary, 
chief of staff, and sergeant major of the Army issued a “Call for Action,” 
challenging the Army to transform its culture regarding operational energy. The 
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Operational Energy Office was officially established under the G-4 Deputy Chief 
of Staff of Logistics. Under this “Call for Action,” a list of initiatives were released 
to provide substantial energy savings for vehicles, aircraft, and soldiers. Some of 
these initiatives include: 
• Apache Aviation Simulator – Located at Fort Rucker, Alabama, this
simulator affords substantial fuel reduction (30% to 50%) because
soldiers use the simulator instead of real aircraft for training. This
simulator allows increased soldier training as well as reduced time
and deterioration on aircraft. The reduction in flight hours also
decreases the risk to equipment and pilots.
• Tactical Fuels Manager Defense (TFMD) – This automated tool
accounts for fuel and provides assistance, that is mission critical, in
decision making for air, ground, and marine fueling requirements at
the enterprise, command, or base levels. TFMD is currently being
utilized at various sites and provides significant insight to fuel
consumption and availability of stock.
• Improved Turbine Engine Program – Discussed in Chapter IV of
this project, this replacement engine will minimize fuel consumption
for the Apache and Black Hawk fleet as well as improve lift,
increase range, and reduce maintenance and production costs.
• Vehicle Modernization – Fuel efficiency for the Abrams and Bradley
will be increased through Engineering Change Proposals. This
includes integrating an auxiliary power unit under the vehicle’s
armor to reduce fuel consumption while the Abrams vehicle is
stationary. The powertrain for the Bradley will be upgraded to
reduce vehicle weight and increase fuel efficiency.
• Performance of Future Platforms – The Army plans to leverage 
items such as design, material, and other enhancements to meet 
the demands of energy-informed operations for future platforms.
(G-4 Public Affairs, 2012)
In the 2016 article titled, “What is the Army doing with Operational 
Energy?,” MAJ Ryan Hulse writes that the Army acknowledges capability 
developers at the Training and Doctrine Command need to add the energy KPP 
to CDDs and CPDs and follow the updated 2015 JCIDS manual, which provides 
instructions to develop the energy KPP. MAJ Hulse states that as the Army 
deploys to fight abroad on an increased basis, the Army will continue to evaluate 
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these energy saving capabilities at warfighting assessments and other Army-
related evaluations. Additionally, MAJ Hulse says that the Army is also 
supporting the development autonomous aerial delivery and autonomous convoy 
operations to reduce risk to soldiers, minimize the logistics footprint, and 
allow faster turnaround time for deployed units (Hulse, 2016).   
B. AS IT RELATES TO TRAINING 
The 2016 DOD Operational Energy Strategy states that the Department 
recognizes training and education should be expanded to include energy 
efficiency as well as best practices in order to improve energy use in current 
operations. This OE strategy also asserts service initiatives such as modeling 
and simulation, war games, and focused analysis, supported by the Operational 
Energy Capability Improvement Fund (OECIF), will be utilized to assess and 
determine the effects of operational energy demand of future CONOPS. The 
DOD then plans to work with concept leads to apply necessary changes to 
facilities, materiel, organization, personnel, policy, and doctrine. The DOEB will 
be the lead for coordinating with effort with DOD components. This includes 
improving energy information fidelity and making it available to planners and 
commanders in order to account for the use of energy across all kinds of 
equipment. The 2016 OE strategy goes on to say that the DOD will continue 
improvements to dashboards, tools for decision-support, as well as planning and 
routing tools to enable members of the Services to utilize this information while in 
the field. Additionally, the DOD plans to include operational energy in various 
exercises and training and incorporate operational energy considerations into 
existing elective courses within the military education curriculum on logistics, 
strategy, acquisition, and campaign planning (DOD, 2016).   
1. Air Force
The U.S. Air Force Energy Strategic Plan (2013) states the Air Force 
recognizes one of the primary ways to foster a culture of energy awareness is by 
education and training. This strategic plan asserts that the Air Education and 
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Training Command is performing a complete review of all the training related 
material, to make sure that operational energy concepts are included. The Air 
Force acknowledges in its strategic plan that this is one of the largest reviews 
ever done in its history. Additionally, this strategic plan says the Air Force 
released an on-line module that provided an overview of the service’s approach 
to OE. The module includes tools for commanders to utilize to emphasize energy 
in respective missions as well as energy techniques, tactics, and procedures to 
be used at home and at work. The Air Force has also invested in an effort called 
Distributed Mission Operations. This effort links simulators for the different types 
of aircraft resulting in increased training event productivity (U.S. Air Force, 2013). 
2. Navy and Marine Corps 
The Navy Energy Training and Education (ET&E) Plan, published in July 
2015, asserts that the Secretary of the Navy established a mandate to develop 
training and education for all uniformed personnel. This plan states that the 
ET&E Working Group was established in July 2013 to assess the extent and 
quality of energy and identify training gaps in its ET&E Continuum. The Navy’s 
ET&E plan is a comprehensive strategy to include learning opportunities about 
energy into the enlisted and officer Training and Education Continuum that will be 
designed to inform personnel in a positive manner, change their behavior, and 
affect a cultural change throughout the Navy. The Navy ET&E Working Group 
identified five energy learning opportunity levels and target audiences to serve as 
the basic structure for developing a Continuum that is comprehensive and fleet-
wide: 
• General ET&E  
• Subject Matter Expertise ET&E 
• Leadership ET&E 
• Advanced Specialized ET&E 
• Fleet Evaluation 
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Additionally, the Navy is planning to augment the existing curriculum at other 
Naval institutions such as the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, 
and the Naval Education and Training Command Schools. Starting in FY15, the 
Navy will focus on four ET&E areas for development, referred to as Block A: 
• Apprentice School Training 
• Officer Accession Training 
• Commanding Officer/Executive Officer/Department Heads Training 
• Senior Enlisted Training 
Vehicles for ET&E will include formal classroom training, e-Learning modules, 
webinars, training documents, and training films. Delivery methods will be 
identified based on priorities and resources. The ET&E Working Group will 
evaluate the Continuum every six months in order to identify additional gaps or 
areas for further development (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2015).   
The DON’s Energy Program for Security and Independence (2010) states 
that the DON plans to implement initiatives for cultural change to ensure that all 
personnel understand that energy management is a priority in all shore, tactical, 
and expeditionary missions. Associating mission achievement to the importance 
of energy security and efficiency will result in a sense of energy excellence being 
instilled in all DON personnel. The DON will use Earth Day in April and Energy 
Awareness Month in October to encourage personnel to show commitment to 
energy program goals. This program also asserts that energy education 
programs and awards will help focus personnel on accomplishing and achieving 
the energy goals set forth by the Secretary of the Navy. The DON plans to 
connect energy efficient behaviors to the performance advancement and 
assessment process (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2010). 
3. Army 
In his 2016 article, MAJ Hulse writes that the Army Operational Energy 
Training Strategy provides the plan for OE practices, techniques, and concepts to 
be incorporated into the self-development, operational, and institutional training 
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domains. In this article, MAJ Hulse states that operational energy training is 
primarily divided into three efforts: education, technical training, and awareness. 
The operational domain will include OE training through technical and home 
station training for advisers, operators, and power managers. MAJ Hulse also 
asserts that operational energy issues will be incorporated into contingency 
training scenarios at combat training centers, as practicable. On the institutional 
side, OE awareness training will begin during initial military training. MAJ Hulse 
writes that the intent is to establish OE principles as habits at the start of military 
service and continue through all levels of military development. The technical 
portions of OE are currently being taught in courses that are military occupational 
specialty (MOS) specific, Hulse writes that more energy-related initiatives should 
be added to other courses. The self-development portion of this training will 
include efforts such as online learning, job aids, training handouts, and 
graphic training aids (Hulse, 2016).   
The Army has a plan to include OE concepts into logistics publications; 
however, no OE doctrine exists for expeditionary operations nor is it addressed in 
any operational publications. The Army plans to work with proponents to add OE 
considerations into select operational publications, such as the following: 
• Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, The Army
Profession
• ADRP 4-0, Sustainment
• ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process
• ADRP 6-0, Mission Command
• ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders
• Field Manual 4-95, Logistics Operations
• Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and
Operations
• Allied Logistic Publication 4.2, Land Forces Logistics Doctrine
(Hulse, MAJ R., 2016)
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The Army has incorporated energy into coursework at the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point and integrated OE topics into course modules at the 
Command and General Staff College. The topic “Energy and National Security” 
has been added to the Key Strategic Issues List at the U.S. Army War College. 
Additionally, OE is used as a topic for a required paper in the Theater Logistics 
Course at Army Logistics University. Additionally, “The Power Is In Your Hands” 
trifold was published and signed by the Sergeant Major of the Army, Chief of 
Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army to evoke a culture change 
regarding energy throughout the Army (U.S. Army Stand-To, 2013). 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
As of late 2016, a gallon of gas costs the average American around two 
dollars a gallon. However, one should consider the risk to loss of life and how 
much that same gallon costs when it must be delivered to the battle field in 
Afghanistan, or as highlighted in the recent National Security Strategy, 
transported across the Pacific Ocean. This research paper has again highlighted 
that DOD is the nation’s single largest user of petroleum fuel and attempted to 
determine what DOD is doing to reduce its consumption. The authors of this 
research paper have discussed the relevance or need for a comprehensive 
strategy, reviewed those major strategies which started essentially in 2001, 
analyzed the related DOD acquisition documents, processes and instructions, 
and lastly, reviewed the DOD services’ progress to promulgate new policies, 
processes and some of the weapon system designs that consume less fuel.   
Projecting sea, air, and land power worldwide requires access to the 
energy necessary to sustain DOD’s weapons systems and mobility platforms. 
The availability of energy for military operations must serve as a strength for U.S. 
forces, and not as a weakness. DOD’s energy resources must be secure, of 
sufficient quantity, and available when needed for whatever duration is necessary 
to support the full spectrum of military operations. This makes energy the critical 
enabler that underpins our military’s fundamental contribution to U.S. national 
security.   
This research paper has captured and highlighted the extensive effort 
underway by the DOD to understand how to more accurately measure cost of 
fuel with FBCF, and what is being done within the DOD to improve the energy 
performance of fuel consuming platforms and weapon systems. It is apparent 
that the DOD is just starting to understand and consider the threats related to fuel 
reliance. We believe this shift in thinking can be linked to a few major factors, 
such as the 9/11 attacks, increased unit cost of gas to four dollars a gallon, 
enemy tactics in the USCENTCOM region to cut off energy supply lines, 
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Congressional directives, and the recent National Security Strategy highlighting 
the focus shift to the USPACOM region which requires extended supply lines that 
are magnified by anti-access and area denial threats.   
This research project essentially started because a small team of DOD 
acquisition professionals understood that the primary way to reduce reliance on 
fuel is to design, modify, produce, and field more fuel-efficient weapon systems, 
and then optimize their application and usage through best practices such as 
those seen in the commercial sector (ground and air). Yet before 2001, it 
appeared as if DOD considered only warfighting performance parameters in 
design and modification programs, and not including reliance on energy or fuel.   
Accordingly, it is essential that operational energy considerations be 
addressed in DOD’s policies and a top priority placed on DOD’s efforts to 
improve and deliver higher fuel efficiency weapon systems to our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and Marines. Trends of the past to ignore fuel consumption in 
weapon system designs are now just starting to shift due to our nation’s financial, 
operational and strategic pressures. The Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2009, 10 USC 2911 § 332, played a key role in driving 
real change within the DOD to consider fuel demands, burden on the supply 
chain, and cost analyses such as FBCE and FBCF in requirements and 
associated acquisitions.  
It is critically important that the DOD remain focused on improving total 
ownership cost calculations and modeling, to include FBCF, and that the Joint 
Staff and service chiefs drive their respective requirements communities to utilize 
the Energy Key Performance Parameter in future weapon systems development 
efforts. Without requiring measureable improvements in energy consumption, the 
services and their acquisition communities will continue to myopically focus on 
warfighting enhancements while ignoring the logistical burden laid at the feet of 
DLA and the deployed commanders to keep energy supply lines open. The DOD 
trend continues to focus more on existing weapon system modernization efforts 
rather than costly and lengthy weapon system new-starts, such as upgrading the 
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B-52, or the Apache AH-64D to AH-64E. Now that this is the trend, Congress and 
DOD need to modify the PPBE process to require the services to reduce fuel/
energy consumption of these legacy fielded systems as they modify and update 
warfighting capabilities. Before a specific weapon system modification funding 
line is approved, the requesting service should be required to include plans to 
incrementally reduce reliance of fuel/energy on that fielded system. Projects like 
the Army’s ITEP or the USAF’s Cost Index Flying are practical examples 
underway to reduce operational energy to include investing in new technologies 
such as the KC-135 and C-5M propulsion upgrade programs that move cargo 
more efficiently, farther, and in less time, with lower fuel costs and maintenance 
costs.   
It is apparent that the services are now making good headway. The DOD 
should leverage best practices from each service and also the commercial sector 
to continue this difficult and complex shift in thinking. Anticipated future national 
challenges and threats noted in the NSS should be driving DOD to have a 
greater sense of urgency and vigilance.  
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APPENDIX.  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
The law that appears to have driven real change in the JCIDS: 
 
 
1. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2009 10 USC 2911 § 332.  
CONSIDERATION OF FUEL LOGISTICS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
IN PLANNING, REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION 
PROCESSES.  
(b) CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS PROCESS.—The Secretary of 
Defense shall develop and implement a methodology to enable the 
implementation of a fuel efficiency key performance parameter in the 
requirements development process for the modification of existing or 
development of new fuel consuming systems. 
(c) ACQUISITION PROCESS.—The Secretary of Defense shall require 
that the life-cycle cost analysis for new capabilities include the fully 
burdened cost of fuel during analysis of alternatives and evaluation of 
alternatives and acquisition program design trades.  
(g) FULLY BURDENED COST OF FUEL DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘fully burdened cost of fuel’’ means the commodity price for fuel plus 
the total cost of all personnel and assets required to move and, when 
necessary, protect the fuel from the point at which the fuel is received from 
the commercial supplier to the point of use.   
 
2. LAW DEFINING OPERATIONAL ENERGY AND RELATED 
TERMS:  
US Law Title 10 U.S.C. § 2924 
(3)  
(A) The term “energy security” means having assured access to reliable 
supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to 
meet mission essential requirements. 
(B)  In selecting facility energy projects that will use renewable energy 
sources, pursuit of energy security means the installation will give 
favorable consideration to projects that provide power directly to a military 
facility or into the installation electrical distribution network. In such cases, 
projects should be prioritized to provide power for assets critical to mission 
essential requirements on the installation in the event of a disruption in the 
commercial grid. 
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(4) The term “hybrid,” with respect to a motor vehicle, means a motor 
vehicle that draws propulsion energy from onboard sources of stored 
energy that are both—  
(A) An internal combustion or heat engine using combustible fuel; and 
(B) A rechargeable energy storage system. 
(5)  The term “operational energy” means the energy required for training, 
moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military 
operations. The term includes energy used by tactical power systems and 
generators and weapons platforms. 
(6)  The term “petroleum” means natural or synthetic crude, blends of 
natural or synthetic crude, and products refined or derived from natural or 
synthetic crude or from such blends.  
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